INTRODUCTION
Death is not what comes to mind when one speaks of going to the Fair-elephant ears, the world's largest pigs, tractor pulls, and so much more . . . but not death. August 13, 2011 was supposed to be another fun-filled day at the Indiana State Fair. Unfortunately, however, the sky blackened and the winds began to stir. Nature had other plans. 1 The country band Sugarland had been scheduled to play at approximately 8:45 PM but, due to the oncoming storm and the band's tight schedule, the killing seven people and injuring several more. 5 Needless to say, an investigation and, eventually, litigation ensued. Several Fair officials would either be terminated or enter early retirement as a result of their role. An investigation determined that the stage, which was owned by America Sound ("Mid-America"), was structurally deficient because it was unable to withstand gusts of up to sixty-eight miles per hour, the industry standard. Victims and survivors filed numerous lawsuits against the Indiana State It is suggested that Sugarland declined to delay the show because they could potentially forfeit all or part of the $300,500 admission fees.
3. Tuohy, supra note 1. It is a matter of debate exactly who chose to continue the concert, as opposed to evacuating the area. Id. The Fair Commission blamed the band and their promoters, who had a concert the next day and were unwilling to cancel the show. Id. The band suggested that the Fair Commission only asked them not to play but did not tell them they could not. Id for any liability incurred as a result of the litigation. As one might expect, the 12 State refused.
13
Mid-America filed third-party and cross-claims against the State to compel indemnification. In response, the State filed for and was granted a motion for There was considerable disagreement between the parties whether this was an agreement at all and much of the case is dedicated to addressing issues of unconscionability and other related contractual issues not relevant to this discussion. See did not apply because the State had validly entered into a contract and that contract was not subject to the limitations of the ITCA, which only governed tort actions.
22
In a firmly worded dissent, Chief Judge Vaidik criticized the majority's opinion for not recognizing a "tort in contract's clothing" and the fact that this type of situation was implicitly accounted for in the ITCA. Specifically, the 23 dissent pointed to Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(10) and the Indiana Supreme This Note will explore the history behind both the ITCA and contractual indemnity and the potential implications of giving the State this right. The purpose of this Note, however, is to advocate for the position that allowing the State to expressly indemnify a private party would not undermine the language or purpose of the ITCA because there are critical distinctions between them, based on the different liabilities, motivations, and natures of the claims themselves. Consequentially, this Note contends that any restraint on this ability would prove to be an unjustified restraint on the State's contracting powers and a grave, equitable failing with regard to the contractual expectations of the private party and the sanctity of contracts in general.
This Note is divided into five parts and each part into relevant sections. Part I will detail a broad history of the development of sovereign immunity and indemnification, with a focus at the end on Indiana's treatment of the doctrines. Parts II through IV will each address the arguments for permitting State indemnification. Parts II and III assume that the relevant state agency has the power to enter into indemnity contracts while Part IV does not. Part V will then briefly discuss the implications and potential motivations for allowing the State this added flexibility.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Sovereign Immunity: History-From Rome to Indianapolis
The contentious nature that sovereign immunity holds today was captured by Justice Stevens when he noted (perhaps with a twinge of sarcasm), "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is nothing but a judge-made rule that is sometimes favored and sometimes disfavored." Most simply defined, sovereign 30 because retroactive application of an insurance or indemnity agreement, where the loss has already occurred, would be a "fool's bargain," the court would only enforce such a burden if it was expressly agreed on; the court would not enforce such an agreement implicitly, e.g., by course of conduct. Id. at 549-50. The court then characterized Mid-America's purported indemnification clause as retroactive and did not find any evidence of an express agreement. Regardless of its vitality today, the doctrine's continued longevity is a testament to its roots in almost a millennium of common and civil law, spanning numerous peoples and cultures.
35
Not surprisingly, the origins of the doctrine are as contentious as the doctrine itself. Certainly, it is hard to imagine that a mere peasant might have been able to entertain a claim against a God-king or emperor in some of the ancient, mighty empires of the past, like Persia, Egypt, or China. Furthermore, it is difficult to link any of these practices to the Western Legal Tradition. The To resolve their dilemma, both theoretical and practical, American leaders and thinkers began to claim that, though feudal in origin, sovereign immunity was actually derived from the very nature of sovereignty -derived from the so- 54. Jaffe, supra note 50, at 19. 55. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 486-87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal."). As suggested by Campbell and the case law leading up to it, courts generally disfavor immunity and strictly construe the ITCA against limitations on a petitioner's right to bring suit. In general, the party seeking immunity bears the 71 burden of demonstrating that its actions fall under the protections of the ITCA. 72 Though the vestiges of the common law approach are still available, because of a policy of acquiescence to the legislature, these options cannot be resorted to unless the government defendant would not be immune under the ITCA. 73 to sue the government on these bills, they were not considered contractual. 85 Indemnity was also present at Indiana's genesis (1816), but, like in other states, indemnity agreements came almost exclusively in the form of bond or insurance agreements; a far cry from the hold-harmless agreements present in many contracts today. Additionally, within a few years of Indiana becoming a 86 state, cases dealing with common law indemnity began to arise, particularly in a government context. However, perhaps as a direct nod to Seckinger, the Indiana 
C. Contractual Indemnity: History-From Rome to Indianapolis
D. Contractual Indemnity: Application and Modern Approach
To enter into a contract to indemnify another party, one must do so "willingly" and "knowingly," which is a relatively to prevent indemnity agreements for another's negligence, save in cases of fraud, unconscionability, unequal bargaining power, or certain public interests.
95
In order for an agreement to be willingly and knowingly entered into, courts strictly interpret proposed agreements and require the language to expressly state in "'clear and unequivocal' terms" that the indemnitor intends to cover the indemnitee for the latter's own negligence. "To be 'clear and unequivocal' the 96 clause must define the 'cause [of damage] in terms of legal or physical responsibility.'" Stated another way, "[t]he concern with the language of an 97 indemnity clause in this area is that it not only define the area of application, that is, negligence, but also define the cause of damages in terms of physical or legal responsibility, that is, to whom the clause applies." As summarized in 98 Hagerman Construction Corporation v. Long Electric Company, the modern analysis for the validity of these types of indemnity agreements simplifies into a brief two-step test:
First, the indemnification clause must expressly state in clear and unequivocal terms that negligence is an area of application where the indemnitor has agreed to indemnify the indemnitee. The second step determines to whom the indemnification clause applies. Again, in clear and unequivocal terms, the clause must state that it applies to indemnification of the indemnitee by the indemnitor for the indemnitee's own negligence.
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E. The Question Restated and Other Jurisdictions
Though it is commonplace in most jurisdictions for the government to seek contractual indemnity from a private entity, very few cases, outside of In re 100 Corp. v. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 570, 577-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (finding an indemnification clause near the bottom of a long paragraph entitled "warning and covenants," where the first two thirds discussed installation and maintenance issues, was not "knowingly" or "willfully" entered into).
93 102. The difficulty of a parallel comparison to the federal practice is that the relevant federal statute, the Tucker Act, levies a $10,000 statutory cap on contracts of this nature; whereas other statutory caps, including Indiana's, deal with caps on tort claims, not contract claims. As such, though persuasive, these sources may only be taken with a grain of salt. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012 proper authority and that such appropriations were made, the court still concluded that the United States could not be compelled to indemnify the private entity because the Tucker Act only covered claims brought pursuant to an express or implied-in-fact contract; not a contract implied in law. In so holding, the court 108 reaffirmed the conclusion that if an agency of the United States had the valid grant of power to enter into an express contract to indemnify a private party, that party could seek indemnification from the government --at least to the breadth permitted by the $10,000 cap.
II. KEY DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PROTECTIONS NEGOTIATED FOR IN AN INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT AND PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE ITCA
A. Differing Thresholds of Intent: Negotiated Versus Inherent
Perhaps the biggest distinction between the liability conferred by an indemnity agreement and the liability conferred under common tort is the threshold intent necessary to confer those liabilities. In order for the State to be 110 liable under an express indemnity agreement, a proponent must demonstrate, while under considerable scrutiny, that the contract was entered into willingly 111 and knowingly and that the terms of the agreement are "clear and unequivocal."
112
As such, the liability conferred in this manner may be characterized as negotiated or deliberate because it can only be conferred through some intentional process-typically a negotiation table. 113 However, to be liable under the ITCA or common tort law, no threshold intent is required; the State could be liable potentially for the simple negligence of one of its workers or agents. One may bring the cause so long as it is not 114 exempted by the statute. As such, the liability conferred to the State in this 115 manner is the liability inherent to any actor potentially capable of committing a tort. Accordingly, the liability can be understood as inherent. Holmes was describing when he characterized tort claims as "forced" indemnity. Ultimately then, it is impossible for an indemnity agreement to 127 undercut the ITCA because the ITCA is only aimed at protecting the State from tort liability, not from the distinct financial liability.
C. Differing Policy Motivations
Though once an academic exercise stemming from the bowels of monarchy and theocracy, sovereign immunity in Indiana has been transformed and predicated repeatedly on the justification of protecting the public treasury. Both 128 before and after the ITCA was passed, this was, and still is, the key purpose 129 along with the additional purposes of promoting the discretion of government employees, and incentivizing workplace safety.
However, these same 130 motivations were present when common law immunity was all but abolished in Campbell. In Campbell, the Indiana Supreme Court took a strong stance against 131 the idea of economic doom due to increased government liability:
The argument has been presented that elimination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity will impose a disastrous financial burden upon the state. Assuming there is any relevancy to this contention, we point out that the abrogation of sovereign immunity on the state level is consistent with conditions already existing in cities and counties in this state. channeling the old adage "better safe than sorry," these motivations continue to incentivize safety despite an indemnity agreement. As opposed to the ITCA's motivations, indemnity is a risk-allocation tool. 136 The purpose is economic in nature-it gives the parties direct control over their risk and lets them either insure themselves for additional consideration or garner a cheaper contract with the risk of potential financial liability. Thus, the 137 policies behind the ITCA cannot be undermined where the potential unwanted suits can be completely controlled by the State through a risk allocation tool; the State would not take any more risk than what it agreed to take. Additionally, there is no reason to think that employee discretion or workplace safety would be undermined by allowing the government to enter into these agreements.
D. Differing Natures: Contract Versus Tort
The traditional notion was that something could not be based both in contract and tort: it had to be one or the other.
Despite appearing seemingly 138 unimportant, this issue can be crucial in determining the subject matter jurisdiction of a court, especially at the federal level, which typically does not [i] t is difficult to see how the same transaction can be made the basis for both a tort and a contract" and that "a party has the right to elect to treat a transaction as a tort or as a contract . . Put in layman's terms, if the agency had already voluntarily waived its protections, then it would be at that point that the purpose of the statute might have been frustrated, not the court's choice to enforce it.
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Considering all four critical distinctions, it is apparent that allowing the State to expressly indemnify a private party would not violate or even abrogate the purpose, function, or scope of the ITCA. Tort liability under the ITCA would still remain at its current low thresholds of intent because the agreements would require a higher threshold to reach and therefore it would be no easier to levy unwanted claims against the State than it has been. Next, the tort liability from 152 which the ITCA was envisioned to protect the State would still be guarded against because the liability any contractual indemnity would levy would be of a distinct, financial variety. Moreover, the chief theoretical motivation behind 153 the ITCA of preventing excess tort suits would still not be disturbed because it could be directly controlled by the State via negotiating what potential risk they would be willing to assume.
Further 
A. Judicial Acquiescence
The State power to contract stems from its sovereignty and from its powers under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that those powers not expressly delegated to the federal government remain with the States and the citizens. By retaining these powers, the State Legislature is entitled to 157 permit means for the State to enter into contracts for the peace, safety, health, happiness, and general well-being of its citizens. Once the legislature grants 158 powers to an agency, it is not set in stone that powers not expressly given or denied are not available to the agency.
If an agency were given broad 159 contracting powers, express indemnity might fall under this inherently, as a natural corollary. Though initially citizens were barred from bringing suit against the State to enforce a contract, the 1851 Indiana Constitution opened the door for the Indiana Legislature to pass acts permitting contract claims to be levied against the State.
160
In the monumental decision Carr v. State (1891), the Indiana Supreme Court ratified this idea by permitting creditors of the State's debt, prior to the new Constitution, to seek payment.
In so holding, the Indiana Supreme Court 161 recognized the equality in treatment and standing before the law, as it relates to a contract between the State and a private party:
As there is a perfect contract, the State is bound to perform it according to its legal tenor and effect, and to redeem the pledge it has declared to be irrevocable. the right of way for all the land which the highway was to occupy. However, 165 after work was already started, the State had failed to procure the necessary right of way; by the time all the right of ways were secured, the project had been delayed by two years and had accumulated significant damages associated with the delay. The State argued it could not be held accountable for that portion of 166 the contract because that term concerned a government function and the principles of sovereignty barred the State from failing to conduct a government function. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that if the State agreed to a 167 term, it would be held responsible for its performance, just like a private citizen, even if the term was a government function. 168 The equal treatment is even more meaningful when one considers that the Indiana Supreme Court has expressly rejected equality before the law in other areas, like torts. As such, the Indiana Supreme Court has implicitly recognized 169 the important distinction between risks that the State has voluntarily taken on and the involuntary risks which the State incurs through the performance of its essential government function. Further, as stated in Carr and Feigel, the State 170 abandons its properties as a sovereign upon entry into a contract. Defenses normally available to a sovereign, like immunity, cannot be allowed in these situations lest the State be allowed an arsenal not available to private defendants. Thus, to permit an immunity defense would be an unjustified restraint on the judicially prescribed equality in contracts, established for over a century in Indiana.
B. Legislative Acquiescence
The idea of express indemnity has grown in prolificacy and is largely a new area of the law in most states, including Indiana. Many of these statutes include express references when the State has forbid itself from indemnifying another party or when the General Assembly found such an agreement to be void as against public policy. But in many other instances, 173 the State has granted an agency broad contracting powers and made no mention of express indemnity.
Thus, the General Assembly is familiar with 174 indemnification and agreements for indemnity and when they wished it, they have taken steps to limit it. So, when the Legislature has given broad contracting powers to an agency, but not expressly forbidden it from entering into an indemnity agreement, the evidence suggests that the State is aware of the implications of its decision. As such, it would be an unjustified restraint on the 175
State's contracting powers to prevent it from entering into such an agreement when broad contracting powers are given.
IV. EQUITABLE CONCERNS-INEQUITY OF PROTECTIONS
A. Equitable Concerns and Estoppel
This Note is based on the assumption that the relevant agency would have the necessary contracting powers for an indemnity agreement. Disregarding that assumption though for this section, equity demands, in situations akin to In re Indiana State Fair Litigation, that the government be enjoined from reneging on its deal.
Not all contracts entered into by a state agency automatically bind the State. For example, a contract entered into by a municipal corporation or an 176 agent "ultra vires," or without the legal authority to do so, would be void as time that parties might agree to express indemnification); Corrao Constr. Co. v. Curtis, 584 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Nev. 1978) (finding for the first time that the NITA did not allow express indemnification); Kirk H. Nakamura, Krusing for a Bruising: Is Total Express Immunity Dead?, 38 ORANGE CNTY LAW. 34, 34 (1996) (noting California's first case addressing express indemnification was in 1975).
172. In comparing 1991's version of the Indiana Code with 2016's version, a search of statutory code, referencing "indemnity" or its derivatives, yields an increase of as many as one hundred additional hits, using a cross reference of WestlawNext and Lexis Advance. Additionally, in performing the same comparison search of Indiana statutory code, referencing "indemnity" or its derivatives within five words or less of "agree," "contract," or "express" and their derivatives, yields an increase of no fewer than twenty-five additional hits, using a cross reference of WestlawNext and Lexis Advance. 194 195 a right to what they negotiated. Despite being far removed from the days of Lochner v. New York, where the U.S. Supreme Court claimed the broad right of freedom to contract, it is a bold 196 leap to suggest the State might not honor its contracts after negotiating for and receiving the benefit of the bargain. It seems appropriate then that where a government action (in this case reneging on a contract) would create a precedent running counter to a fundamental underpinning of the economic system, this would be a sufficient instance where a government action might threaten the public interest and thus reason to qualify these sorts of instances for estoppel.
B. Unbalanced Extrajudicial Protections
Besides the equitable questions, the State has a panoply of means to prevent itself from procuring financial liability under an express indemnification, outside of court. The agreement can only be entered into knowingly and willfully; thus the State could not assume any liability that it was not meaning to assume. If 197 it is a matter of controlling an overzealous agency, the legislature has routinely, expressly defined when certain government entities would or would not have the authority to enter into such agreements.
Considering the large amount of 198 precedent statutes and the low-salience of the topic, the General Assembly could easily pass a law limiting these specific contract powers in a state agency. In stark contrast, outside of court, a private party would have a much more difficult time assuring redress for the State's refusal to honor an indemnity agreement. As was a concern even in the early republic, the Founders believed 199 that it was best to let the judiciary adjudicate issues involving the government's financial liability because of the legislature's jealous hold on the power of the purse. This concern still holds water today as it appears to be the dictionary 200 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:369 government less likely to engage in said behavior. Thus, the threat of being 207 held accountable and potentially losing one's job and livelihood could potentially urge government workers to take more careful steps at work, such as carefully reading the terms of their contract, although studies on the threat of termination have had mixed results as far as improved productivity or quality.
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B. More Efficient Governance
First, determining the enforceability of an indemnity agreement can, like most litigation, be a long and costly process. Rather than be boiled down in claims for implied indemnification and numerous hearings to determine who must indemnify whom, an express agreement brings predictability and eliminates such drawn out disputes, saving State time and resources. In addition to saving the 209 State resources, it would clear more space on court dockets and allow trial courts to attend to more pressing matters.
Second, these agreements would afford government contracts more flexibility in cost and risk exchange (for example: a higher rate for no indemnification as opposed to a lower rate but with indemnification) and would allow more options for the government to seek, depending on its financial circumstances. Most 210 simply, the State would have more alternatives to bargain for and with, which could allow agencies short on funds to negotiate a lower rate by signing an indemnity agreement.
Such flexibility would also allow the State reduce 
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realities with a dynamic marketplace.
C. Reduction in Pecuniary and Temporal Waste in the Private Sector
Just as the uncertainty of an indemnity provision can tie up state funds, it can also impede assets in the private sector. Rather than needing to worry and set aside contingency funds for the realistic chance that their agreement with the State might get thrown aside, private entities would be more certain as to their future obligations and be able to more appropriately allocate their resources, thus reducing economic waste.
In addition to avoiding the loss of pecuniary 213 resources, allowing these agreements could save valuable time and effort.
Creating the predictability of knowing the maximum extent of one's own financial liability avoids a "chilling effect" on larger corporations and their 214 upper management. This allows them to operate more effectively and helps 215 avoid unbridled drops in stock and production; although some commentators 216 have described the benefit of these agreements more as retaining the services of strong upper management. Either way, allowing the private sector to utilize 217 these deals with the State could very easily lead to a reduction of waste, both pecuniary and temporal.
CONCLUSION
In John Milton's eminent Paradise Lost, he sets forth to explain the events surrounding the original sin of man and man's expulsion from Paradise (The Garden of Eden).
Although the title of the book leads one to believe that it is 218 
